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ABSTRACT 
Taxation and Education Investment in the Tertiary Sector  
by Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad* 
In this paper we briefly report some key data on educational expenditure and output in 
OECD countries and then turn to the motivations for public education. Public education 
can be important for equal opportunities and has a number of redistributional aspects 
within and between generations. We further discuss possible externalities of education, 
the issue of intersectoral investment neutrality and a fundamental time consistency 
problem of optimal taxation that may make public expenditure on tertiary education 
desirable from an efficiency point of view. Further we discuss whether and how global-
ization changes the picture. Mobility changes the analysis of optimal taxation and may 
make public expenditure less important. We also emphasize insurance aspects and the 
role of mobility differences.  
 
Keywords: Taxation, education, human capital investment 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Besteuerung und Bildungsinvestitionen im tertiären Sektor 
Wir berichten zunächst einige wesentliche Daten zu öffentlichen Ausgaben für Bildung 
in den OECD-Ländern und zu deren Wirkung. Im Zentrum der Arbeit steht eine 
Diskussion der unterschiedlichen Begründungen für öffentliche Bildungsinvestitionen. 
Zunächst wird auf die Argumente der Chancengleichheit und auf die intragenerationalen 
und intergenerationellen Umverteilungswirkungen von öffentlichen Bildungs-
investitionen eingegangen. Sodann wird das Zusammenspiel von Besteuerung und 
öffentlichen Bildungsinvestitionen problematisiert. Es zeigt sich, dass öffentliche 
Bildungsinvestitionen die staatliche Korrektur für eine Form von Staatsversagen sein 
können, das darin besteht, dass der Staat bei zeitkonsistenter optimaler Besteuerung 
Bildungsinvestitionen ex-post zu stark besteuert. Wir diskutieren ferner die Wirkungen 
der Globalisierung, besonders der zunehmenden Mobilität von Humankapitalträgern für 
die Frage öffentlicher Bildungsinvestitionen und konzentrieren uns dabei auf den 
Zusammenhang von Besteuerung und öffentlichen Bildungsausgaben. Mobilität kann 
das Zeitkonsistenzproblem lösen und kann einen der Gründe für öffentliche 
Bildungsinvestitionen eliminieren. Zu berücksichtigen sind zudem Versicherungs-
aspekte und der Aspekt von Mobilitätsunterschieden für verschiedene Berufsgruppen. 
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1. Introduction 
The public sector massively intervenes in the education sector in practically all OECD 
countries. Via free public provision of education, transfers to students, or high subsidies 
on education, the government strongly influences the private education decisions. Edu-
cation has elements of investment and consumption. For an analysis of public education 
policy the investment aspects are more relevant, and in what follows we will concen-
trate on these aspects. 
Expenditures on education goods – from private and public sources – were 5.75 per-
cent of GDP on average in the OECD countries in 1998 (OECD 2001a, p. 80). The 
variation in total expenditures across OECD countries was modest, ranging from 3.5 
percent of GDP in Turkey and 4.6 in the Netherlands, to 7.0 percent in Korea and 7.2 
percent in Denmark. 
The public sector carries the lion share of the costs of education in most OECD 
countries. In many countries primary and secondary education is financed almost exclu-
sively by the public sector. An interesting fact is that the top group in terms of total ex-
penditures includes countries with among the largest shares of public funding, like 
Sweden and Denmark, as well as countries with among the smallest public financing 
shares, like Korea and the US (cf. OECD 2001a, p. 93). 
As has been illustrated by Carl Emmerson and Howard Reed (2002), roughly a 
fourth of the education-goods expenditures are made on tertiary education; the OECD 
average is 1.59 percent of GDP. It is important to note that the public-sector share 
seems to be larger in countries with higher income taxes. In fact, the correlation be-
tween the public-financing shares and the top marginal tax rates in 1998, is 0.42.1 This 
positive correlation is in line with the hypothesis that public education spending is – at 
least to some extent – a second-best response to a problem of time-consistent overtaxa-
tion of the returns on human capital; we will discuss the hypothesis below. 
There are several possible measures of the outcome of education expenditures. A 
measure of the overall use of education – both as a consumption good and as an invest-
ment good – is the average total amount of (tertiary) education acquired. The number of 
years is roughly in line with the resources spent; the correlation between total expendi-
tures and expected number of years is 0.70.2  
A related measure of the output of the education system, often argued to be particu-
larly relevant for the broader economic performance of a country, is the extent to which 
an education system produces workers with high skills in science and technology. Fig-
ure 1 shows the number of science graduates (per 100 000) in a number of countries; the 
mean is 1200.  
                                                 
1 Public-sector shares from OECD (2001a, p. 81); marginal tax rates from OECD (2001b, pp. 38-39); 
countries for which either measure is unavailable are excluded. 
2 Total expenditures from OECD (2001a, p. 81); expected number of years from OECD (2001a, 
p. 133); countries not reporting both are excluded. 
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Figure 1: Number of science graduates per 100 000 persons in the labour force  
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 Source: OECD (2001a, p. 172).  
 
Notably, this statistic is very weakly related to total expenditures on tertiary education; 
the correlation is 0.04 (expenditures from OECD 2001a, p. 81)3.  
As surveyed by Temple (2001), empirical estimates of the private monetary return to 
schooling typically are in the range between 5 percent and 15 percent (depending on 
time and country), and the positive correlation between schooling and earnings is robust 
and uncontroversial.4,5 A different way to measure the returns on education is to use 
macroeconomic variables. Temple (2001) also surveys this literature. According to 
these results, about 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points of annual growth can be attributed to 
improvements in labor quality.6  
                                                 
3 There are some cross-country comparisons of basic skills that may throw light on some aspect of the 
stock of human capital with particular reference to Sweden. It seems that the relatively large amount 
of resources spent on primary (and secondary) education in Sweden pays off in terms of literacy. In a 
comparison of 12 OECD countries 1994-95 (OECD 1999, ch. 2) Sweden had uniformly the best liter-
acy levels across age groups. Looking directly at scores obtained at a literacy test, Sweden ranked uni-
formly first across education levels. The record seems less unambiguously favorable as regards 
achievements in mathematics. In a test of 8th-grade students across all OECD countries, the average 
score among Swedish students was essentially equal to the mean; this is subject to some caution, how-
ever, since Swedish 8th-graders have one year less formal schooling than those in most other coun-
tries – this fact, on the other hand, seems noteworthy by itself. (There are findings indicating that 
mathematics is particularly important for labour-market success; see Björklund 2000.) 
4 See also OECD (1997), Wright (1999) and Pereira and Silva Martins (2000). 
5 Björklund (2000) estimates simple log-linear wage equations for Sweden finding that the return to an 
additional year of education was a 4.6 percent wage increase; he also, however, discusses a number of 
limitations of simple estimates, and cites (scarce) evidence of education subsidies impacting measured 
private returns strongly. 
6 Strong effects are reported from Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), suggesting that doubling of in-
vestment in human capital yields an increase in output per worker by about 50 percent. However, 
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2. Motivations for public education 
As reported in the previous section, governments in all OECD countries carry out an 
active education policy. In order to evaluate this policy, it is important to understand 
why the government intervenes in this market for investment goods. There are several 
reasons for this public intervention, some of which address efficiency aspects, while 
others relate to distributional aspects. 
Equal opportunities and redistribution 
A point that is frequently made is the “equal opportunities” argument, according to 
which it is considered desirable to give access to education investment to all children, 
regardless of the wealth, social status or education of their parents. The desirability of 
equal opportunities could be justified by normative equity considerations as well as ef-
ficiency considerations. If there is heterogeneity among individuals with respect to their 
ability to turn education investment into earnings or output, it would imply a loss in 
efficiency if only the children of the rich have access to human capital investment op-
portunities since the rents from investment for children of poor parents with high returns 
on human capital investment would be lost. 
Access to human capital investment is often restricted. First, children of poor parents 
may be unable to finance their university education by a private loan due to imperfec-
tions in the private credit markets. The government could open the access for this group 
of children by student loans, and by public provision of free university education. Sec-
ond, and related to this, investment in human capital is a risky business. If there are no 
private markets for diversifying these risks, the government may step in and provide 
insurance by sharing in the investment cost as well as in the returns from the investment 
via labor income taxation. This second consideration has been the basis of much theo-
retical analysis (see, e.g., Eaton and Rosen 1980, Varian 1980, Hamilton 1987, and An-
derberg and Andersson 2001). Third, there may be an inefficient allocation of informa-
tion about human capital investment opportunities, with children of parents with a supe-
rior educational background having superior access to information; this may cause some 
inefficiencies. 
Empirically there is a strong link between parents’ education and their children’s 
education investment. This has been shown, for instance for the U.K., by Ermisch and 
Francesconi (2001), for Sweden in Högskoleverket (1997, pp. 45-47), and for Germany, 
by Grüske (1994, p. 95n). Erikson and Jonsson (1996, ch. 1) scrutinize the evidence 
concerning the achievement of equal opportunity more broadly from a mainly socio-
logical perspective, “equal opportunity” meaning, essentially, that the educational dis-
tribution is independent of origin. Erikson and Jonsson conclude that while there are a 
number of factors that appear to promote equal opportunity (generally equitable living 
                                                                                                                                               
Temple (2001) also surveys the discussion that explains that these figures may strongly overestimate 
the effect. 
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conditions being one such factor), there are only a few factors that have a clearly dis-
cernible favorable effect. The two most important such factors are the elimination of 
early decision points for students (contrary to some intuition, students’ choices are more 
sensitive to their background early on), and the elimination of “dead ends” in the educa-
tion system, i.e. elimination of lines of study that do not qualify for continuation.7 
Moreover, Erikson and Jonsson point out that a meritocratic system – i.e. a system 
which is selective with selection based purely on merit rather than involving subjective 
evaluations – on the whole tends to promote equal opportunity in the sense described. 
As to the effect of incentives on equal opportunity, this is a more controversial matter; 
Sjögren (2000) builds a model where a student’s uncertainty about their ability in a 
particular occupation is larger the larger the “distance” from parental occupation. She 
estimates the model on Swedish data, confirming the model prediction that students 
from poor backgrounds are more sensitive to economic incentives for education. Erik-
son and Jonsson (1996) also consider the evidence concerning the effect of incentives, 
and conclude that there is evidence in both directions.  
In order to assess these arguments as a basis for governmental intervention from an 
efficiency point of view, one needs to analyze the reasons for the constraints, and ask 
why the government could do better than the market. 
A virtue of standard education policy is that it enables individuals who are credit 
constrained – i.e. individuals who are unable to finance their investments in the credit 
market – to make investments in human capital. This notion has received considerable 
attention in development economics (see e.g. Aghion and Bolton 1997) and it is clear 
that credit markets are far from perfect due to asymmetric information and incentive 
problems. The government influences the market outcome by a number of regulations, 
in particular between borrowers and lenders. For instance, high minimum income guar-
antees and regulations that shift the burden of individual bankruptcy away from the bor-
rower to the lender or to society are clearly beneficial from an ex-post view. High 
minimum income guarantees yield insurance, and bankruptcy regulations that waive 
individual debt after a short time period have nice incentive effects for starting to earn 
income again for those individuals who have become bankrupt and are locked in a pov-
erty trap otherwise. From an ex-ante point of view, however, minimum income guaran-
tees reduce the available collateral in lending relationships, and bankruptcy laws that 
make it easy to leave the state of bankruptcy generate moral hazard incentives and may 
reduce or eliminate the scope for private market arrangements. For these considerations, 
the scope for government action on credit market constraints and the non-existence of 
private insurance markets is limited. 
The answer regarding whether the government can really improve upon a laissez-
faire outcome, depends on what causes the market imperfections and credit constraints. 
                                                 
7 Recent work by Meghir and Palme (2001) – employing a rather rare instance of a natural experiment 
produced by the gradual introduction of the Swedish comprehensive school in the 1960’s – corrobo-
rates this idea; the elimation of a “dead end” in the old system changed the distribution of education 
obtained significantly. 
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If education activity and the use of subsidized education goods are unobservable, the 
general insights in Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) on moral hazard in insurance markets ap-
ply: in many cases the government can indeed improve upon the laissez-faire moral-
hazard equilibrium by a mandatory scheme by which lump-sum financed education 
goods are subsidized or provided for free to all individuals.8  
Credit market constraints and the information advantages of children with parents 
with above average education may provide a clear basis for some education policy on 
redistributional grounds. Actual education policy, however, does not deliver the type of 
redistribution that is desirable from an “equal opportunities” point of view. Given that 
the percentage of children that takes up a university education is positively correlated 
with variables like parents’ status or income, the present system is redistributive, but it 
redistributes on average more to families with rich or highly educated parents than to 
poor families.9 
If education investment is a transfer from parents to children, then intergenerational 
aspects must be considered. Suppose the transfers are motivated by altruism. Given the 
strong correlation between parents’ income and educational attainment and their chil-
dren’s educational attainment, public funding of university education is a redistribution 
from poor parents to rich parents. The redistributive impact is further increased if one 
takes into account the fact that in-kind transfers of education goods have to be used by 
rich parents to overcome a Samaritan’s dilemma problem that is faced particularly by 
rich parents if they are altruistically linked with their children, as has been pointed out 
by Bruce and Waldman (1991).10  
                                                 
8 The intuition why the government can do what private insurance companies could not do in a com-
petitive laissez-faire environment is as follows. Suppose an individual could purchase an education 
good that increases the probability of becoming highly productive, say, a book. Suppose that, from a 
welfare point of view, it would be beneficial if this book is purchased, because its cost are smaller 
than the expected human capital value it generates, but that this book is not purchased in the laissez-
faire moral-hazard equilibrium with competitive insurance markets. The government can charge a 
lump-sum tax from everyone and hand out the book for free to overcome this problem. An insurance 
company cannot do the same thing because nothing prevents the insured from re-selling the book to 
someone who has purchased no or less insurance coverage from another insurance company that does 
not use a contract that includes the purchase of the book. 
9 Another aspect of this argument is the social Samaritan’s dilemma problem (see Bruce and Waldman 
1991). If children have to finance their education investment and have to pay back a loan (whether 
this is a private loan or a public loan only makes a gradual difference with this problem), then it may 
be individually rational for the children to use up the loan and to stay below a critical income level at 
which repayments of the loan would start during their professional life, if such a critical income level 
exists (it exists in all welfare societies). One theoretical way to escape from this problem is to abolish 
or lower the critical income level. But this policy conflicts with the goals of a welfarist society. Alter-
natively, the educational grant could be made unconditional. This policy requires that there are other 
sources of government revenue that could be used for funding such a policy, but given the welfare 
losses that can be generated by the hold-up problem that is described by this Samaritan’s dilemma, 
this cross subsidization may be worthwhile. 
10 If parents are altruistic and sufficiently rich, children may abstain from education investment in order 
to elicit an increase in transfers and bequests from their parents. This outcome is inefficient, and in-
kind transfers to the children, like payment of tuition fees, can solve the dilemma. There is no strate-
gic behavior that could induce huge bequests from poor parents, and rich parents thus have an addi-
tional incentive to provide education to their children that poor parents do not have. A publicly pro-
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If the aim of education policy is redistribution according to an equal opportunities 
argument11, one may re-consider its targeting. We will briefly discuss an education pol-
icy that could improve targeting. The policy is based on the idea of self-selection and 
has been outlined, for instance, by Besley and Coate (1991). A person can, at a given 
time, consume only one type or quality level of education. For instance, the consump-
tion of an undergraduate program in some discipline at a public university without tui-
tion fees, and a similar program at a private university with high tuition fees are mutu-
ally exclusive. Suppose that the government decides to provide free public education on 
the university level and chooses a low or intermediate quality level (e.g., large classes, 
few teachers per student), and finances this program by a per-capita tax. Then poor par-
ents and rich parents both have to make a decision whether to send their child to the 
tuition-free school, or whether to spend high tuition fees for an outstanding program. If 
university education for their children is a normal good, the population will be divided 
along income lines: the poor will prefer the tuition-free program, whereas the rich will 
not make use of the tuition-free program. Instead, they will send their children to the 
very top private schools, even though this implies paying high tuition fees. As a result, 
the poor and the rich jointly finance the tuition-free programs, but only the poor use it. 
Accordingly, some equalizing income redistribution can be achieved. Note that the gov-
ernment does not need to distinguish between poor and rich parents to make this work. 
It is the self-selection by which the rich decide to abstain from using the publicly pro-
vided programs that brings about the desired income redistribution. 
The returns to education and external effects     
Empirical estimates of the returns to education were provided in section 1. For an as-
sessment of education policy one needs to ask whether the total return to education is 
higher or lower than the private return. According to Temple (2001, p.10), given the 
state of the art one cannot decide whether education investment generates these returns 
through productivity increases, or through signaling and information processing on ex-
isting productivity differences. Note also that both types of achievements have private 
and social benefits such that this question is not decisive for whether the public returns 
of education exceed or fall short of the private returns. Elementary education, language 
skills, writing or reading skills, foreign language skills, and more recently computer 
skills are important for the functioning of communication, and they are therefore poten-
tially associated with network externalities. Similar arguments may be used for skills 
stemming from advanced education, such as a common cultural or intellectual back-
                                                                                                                                               
vided university system can crowd out these private incentives. There is evidence that the relationship 
between social background and labour-market success gets weaker with higher education (Erikson 
and Jonsson 1996, pp. 45-46); such a relationship is in accordance with this argument. 
11 It is a legitimate question whether the existing types of education policy are designed to bring about 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, or to provide equal opportunities, or whether their distribu-
tional implications are on purpose. As is discussed in Epple and Romano (1996), the political econ-
omy outcome has a tendency for redistribution from the ends of the income distribution towards the 
middle. 
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ground.12 The relevance of such network externalities is probably more pronounced for 
elementary education (reading, writing, basic mathematics), and also relevant for some 
intermediate (secondary) education. For tertiary education the relevance of network 
externalities is probably rather limited, and free university education should probably 
not build on this type of argument.13  
An important external effect of education goods has been emphasized by the modern 
theory of endogenous growth. (See, e.g., Lucas 1988). The corner stone of this theory is 
that investment in capital generates returns, but only some of these returns can be ap-
propriated by the owner of the investment. Some of the returns “spill over” in a very 
dispersed way across the whole economy. But if only some fraction of the benefits of an 
investment is internalized in the decision of the investor, then underinvestment results. 
Accordingly, the economy suffers from underinvestment, and this is where governmen-
tal intervention may have its role.14,15 The relevance of this argument depends on 
whether such macroeconomic spillovers of investment exist or not, and if they exist, 
how important they are. It is difficult to distinguish from a theoretical perspective 
whether such spillovers result primarily from human capital investment, from spending 
on research and development, or on other investment activities, such as investing in 
physical assets, and empirical analyses do not reveal particularly unambiguous results. 
Sectoral neutrality     
Investment in human capital is only one of many alternative types of investment. In a 
laissez-faire economy, the various types of investment are used up to the point where 
they have the same marginal return. In a welfare state the various types of investment 
are typically distorted by taxes and regulations. These distortions of human capital in-
vestment may provide a second-best argument for public education policy.   
Many Nordic countries (e.g., Norway, Sweden, Finland, and with modifications 
Denmark) tax the returns of different types of investment differently. Instead of follow-
ing the principle of global income taxation that sums up all sources of income and sub-
jects it to a uniform tax schedule, a dual system taxes capital income from ownership of 
physical assets at a lower rate than labour income; returns from human capital are part 
                                                 
12 For a formal analysis of such network effects of, for instance, language skills, and the resulting ineffi-
ciencies, see, for instance, Konrad and Thum (1993). 
13 Gradstein and Justman (1999a, 1999b) consider similar externalities, claiming that education has a 
“socializing” function. If the education system is fully privatized, the outcome might be a less ho-
mogenous society with fewer common norms and value judgements. They argue in line with the the-
ory of network externalities in Gradstein and Justman (1999a) that education can integrate a society if 
the education system is appropriately designed, and that to achieve this needs government interven-
tion. Parents do internalize only some part of the benefits of a higher degree of integration; that is, 
they take into account that integrating their own children benefits them, but they disregard that this 
also benefits the rest of the society. Accordingly, a fully privately designed education system may 
provide too little integration. While this is an interesting idea, it is mainly an argument for government 
intervention in the design of education, and not necessarily an argument that concerns the question 
whether education should be privately or publicly funded. 
14 See, for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Eckstein and Zilcha (1994). 
15 Further external effects occur with the education system. See, e.g., Epple and Romano (1998). 
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of labor income. Hence, the marginal tax rate on the returns of human capital exceeds 
the marginal tax rate on capital returns. 
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) argue that investment in human capital is not discrimi-
nated against, despite this fact. Whereas taxed earnings (savings) are typically the 
source of physical investment, a major share of human capital investment is generated 
from diverting leisure towards education effort. This leisure is an untaxed source of in-
come. They conclude from this that there are tax advantages in human capital invest-
ment, and these tax advantages counteract the distortionary effect of higher marginal tax 
rates on the returns of human capital, compared with physical capital. 
Exactly the opposite result is obtained in an analysis by Nerlove, Razin, Sadka and 
von Weizsäcker (1993). They assume that the same (taxed) input is used to make in-
vestment in human capital and investment in physical capital. They conclude that hu-
man capital investment is discriminated against due to differences in depreciation al-
lowances. Both physical assets and human capital depreciate. However, whereas depre-
ciation of physical assets reduces taxable income, the depreciation of human capital is 
not (or very partially) accounted for in the tax laws. 
Given these two countervailing effects, the question whether actual laws discrimi-
nate more strongly against investment in physical assets or investment in human capital, 
cannot be decided easily. However, the analysis shows that there is some distortion be-
tween the inputs into human capital formation. We should expect that the input mix 
between time used for education, and (monetary) resources that are spent for education 
goods, is inefficient; a substitution of time by monetary effort is likely to improve wel-
fare.16 As it may be difficult for the government to measure and observe actual mone-
tary or time effort, it must rely on second-best tools like co-financing goods that are 
complementary with education.  
This insight has some implications. It suggests that an efficient education policy 
should change the private cost of different education inputs differently. Monetary inputs 
in education should be subsidized relatively more than time use. It could also be useful 
from this perspective to have requirements on maximum time periods for achieving cer-
tain education goals. 
Government failure      
Human capital investment returns are taxed heavily. The maximum marginal tax rate on 
labor income in OECD countries was 50.2 percent on average in 1998. New Zealand 
had the lowest top marginal rate (33 percent), and Belgium had the highest rate with 66 
percent (see OECD, 2001b). Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996) apply the idea of 
time consistent capital income taxation by a benevolent government that was formulated 
by Kydland and Prescott (1980) to human capital investment. Human capital investment 
                                                 
16 This point had been made already by Kaplow (1993). The inefficiency in the input mix does not imply 
that the absolute amount of time used in the production of human capital is too high. Given the vari-
ous distortions at work, there may well be underinvestment in the sense that more monetary inputs 
and more time should be used in the production of human capital. 
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is made when individuals are young. Its returns accrue 10 to 40 years later. Any invest-
ment made is sunk at the point when the taxes on human capital returns are decided. 
Individuals in their thirties, in midst of their working life, cannot react to high marginal 
taxes by a reduction in their human capital investment. A government that aims at effi-
cient taxation and that wants to minimize the welfare losses from tax-induced substitu-
tion effects knows that the tax rate on human capital returns does not distort human 
capital formation at the time when the actual tax is chosen, because human capital in-
vestment is already chosen and sunk at that point in time. Accordingly, the government 
chooses a high tax burden on the returns from the existing stock of human capital. 
Individuals anticipate this type of tax policy already when they make their human 
capital investment decisions. The high expected tax burden is a disincentive for human 
capital investment at this time when this stock of investment is still endogenous. Time 
consistent tax policy therefore yields high tax rates on the returns from human capital, 
too low education investment, too small a stock of human capital, and possibly little tax 
revenue. Time consistent tax policy results in a situation with excessive taxation and 
underinvestment in human capital. The government would be better advised to follow a 
commitment strategy in which it commits to a tax policy for the next few decades. It 
would commit to lower tax rates than the ones that are ex-post optimal in a time consis-
tent framework. Human capital investment would be higher, and even the governmental 
tax revenue could possibly be higher than in the situation with anticipated time consis-
tent excessive tax policy. 
The central question is how to achieve an appropriate degree of commitment that 
can avoid the welfare cost of discretionary time consistent governmental behavior. This 
commitment problem is particularly severe; it requires that the government credibly 
commits to tax rates for the next 30 to 40 years, knowing that these desirable tax rates 
are much lower than the tax rates that the government would actually like to choose 30 
or 40 years later. It can be doubted that commitment is feasible for such a long time 
period.17  
Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996) offer a solution: they suggest mandatory 
education, or, perhaps more appropriate for tertiary education, subsidized public provi-
sion of education. Governmental intervention is caused here by another governmental 
intervention. Public subsidies are not a means for curing a market failure, but they cure 
a government failure.18  
                                                 
17 There is an intimate relation between the time consistency issue regarding redistributive taxation, and 
the appropriate education policy. One may want to redistribute via the provision of education goods 
ex-ante, and generate an environment with equal opportunities at the education stage. But if the suc-
cess of education investment is to some extent stochastic, there may be scope for redistribution even 
if, at some point in time, all individuals were in a situation with equal opportunities. We will not pur-
sue this line of arguments here, however. 
18 Several solutions to the government failure of excessive time consistent taxation of human capital 
returns have been proposed in other contexts, but none of these solutions seems to be suitable for time 
periods of 30 years. Two types should be mentioned. Kehoe (1989) suggested that international mo-
bility of tax bases and tax competition can substitute for the ex-post inelasticity of the tax base, limit-
ing the scope for excessive taxation. We will come back to this when considering the issue of global-
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The same incentive problems appear for a Leviathan government that aims at maxi-
mizing the tax surplus, net of public investment. If a dictator, or a small power group, 
extorts a country and maximizes the surplus that can be extracted from extorting the 
country, any expenditure this group makes in terms of investment that enhances the 
country’s output and prosperity in the future, is similar to the private investment by the 
owner of a company. This analogy has been pointed out by Olson (1993) and McGuirre 
and Olson (1996) more generally. The dictator of a country who earns returns from 
governing the country today may consider how much to invest in the country. The in-
vestment increases the output and productivity of the country which he extorts, and he 
will be able to appropriate a share of the increase in output that is generated by the unit 
of investment. The dictator will invest up to the point where the sacrifices of the unit of 
investment which he gives up for investment equals the benefits from the share of the 
increased output which he can appropriate. Hence, his investment incentive is higher the 
higher is the share of the marginal returns from investment which the dictator can ap-
propriate. As long as the share of marginal returns which can be appropriated by the 
dictator is smaller than 100 percent, the dictator will invest too little.19  
Andersson and Konrad (2000b) show that a dictator and a benevolent government 
that would like to collect and redistribute taxes face very similar time consistency prob-
lems of income taxation. A revenue maximizing dictator would then have similar incen-
tives to use education subsidies as a second-best tool to cure this problem. 
3. Globalization 
International mobility of production, inputs, consumption goods, information, knowl-
edge, skills, and individuals has increased recently. In this section we consider the im-
pact of this trend for tertiary education. Two main aspects will be highlighted. First, 
increased mobility generates fiscal externalities. These fiscal externalities have incen-
tive effects for the amount and type of public and private education and tax policy. Sec-
ond, increased mobility changes individuals’ exposure to risk and their risk manage-
ment tools. But before we turn to these policy aspects we consider some empirical as-
pects of skill mobility; while this is not the only type of mobility with implications for 
tax and education policies, it is the one with most direct such implications. 
                                                                                                                                               
ization. Konrad (2001) discusses rents from asymmetric information on the actual productivity impact 
of individual human capital investments as a means to reduce the welfare effects of excessive time 
consistent taxation.   
19 Konrad (1995) follows a similar argument with respect to an economy with overlapping generations 
in which the old generation is in power and extorts the young generation by means of a pay-as-you-go 
financed social security system on the one-hand side, and provides output-enhancing public infrastruc-
ture and education investment on the other. 
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On the significance of skill mobility     
We would expect skill mobility to be increasing for a number of reasons. For instance, 
in Europe, the common market with free mobility of factors, goods and people has been 
advanced in 1992. Portability of social insurance entitlements for workers who migrate 
between different European countries has also been improved.20 In addition, the world 
has moved closer together by a number of developments. International trade has grown, 
and many consumption products – including music, movies, and even television series – 
have been standardized worldwide and have become universally available. 
To assess international skill mobility empirically, turns out to be difficult however. 
A comprehensive effort in this direction is the work on Nordic skill migration by Peder-
sen, Røed and Schröder (2002).  
It is often presumed that people with more education are more prone to migrate in-
ternationally. There are some obvious reasons for this presumption. It seems, for exam-
ple, clear that education directly or indirectly makes people acquainted with foreign 
countries and foreign culture; language skills, of course, is an obvious case in point. It 
also seems clear that the fact that a higher degree of specialization coming with a higher 
education calls for searching a larger labor market; specialized skills in science, acade-
mia or engineering may be demanded only by a small number of employers in a coun-
try. There are, however, potentially countervailing forces; Röed (1996) points out that 
firm-specific skills may grow more rapidly for workers with more education, creating a 
stronger tie with the current employer. One can also argue that asymmetric information 
regarding skills is increasing in the skill level, and that it is therefore more expensive for 
high-skill workers to signal their skills to a foreign employer rather than a domestic one. 
Empirically, the work of Pedersen et al. (2002) shows for the countries considered – 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden – that migration is considerably higher for workers 
with more education. This may suggest that they are more mobile; also it seems clear 
that these are the workers most susceptible to wage incentives. 
Concerning the magnitude of emigration from the countries considered, Pedersen et 
al. find that it is quite small, and that return migration moderates the likely impact of 
emigration of skilled workers. Nevertheless, they find, for example, that net emigration 
from Sweden of some key categories of workers has been significant recently (table 5). 
Thus, while it seems clear that migration is relatively small, this is subject to a number 
of caveats.21 First, the significance of even a small increase of emigration would be sub-
stantial if those emigrating were to return to a lesser extent than is historically the case, 
and the extent of return migration is not observable until some time after emigration has 
                                                 
20 Of course, considerable obstacles remain and will remain given that social security systems in Europe 
differ along many dimensions (e.g., size, links between contributions and benefits, redistributional 
elements, or types of funding). However, the progress that has been made in the EU already is re-
markable. 
21 A discussion of empirical problems and a survey of some facts that support the hypothesis of in-
creased mobility is given in Wildasin (2000a). He concludes that labor mobility has increased in 
Europe within the last decade, but that mobility is far from being perfect. 
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taken place. Second, equilibrium migration is not a good indicator of potential migra-
tion. The fact that migration of skilled labor within Europe is small may be due to in-
trinsically low mobility, or to relatively weak incentives. It is therefore very hard to 
predict the effects of stronger incentives and reduced institutional impediments to mi-
gration. 
These caveats are important in light of the fact that a number of impediments to skill 
mobility are subject to attack by the EU. There are efforts, for instance, to facilitate 
portability of social benefits and to standardize university exams. Moreover, the dra-
matic increase in student exchange among EU countries may be significant. The com-
bined effect of exam standardization and student exchange is interesting: One potential 
problem for highly-educated workers is the lack of information a foreign employer may 
have regarding the worker’s qualifications; reducing this informational asymmetry may 
serve to remove a substantial impediment to international skill migration.22 Such con-
siderations open up for the possibility that the combined effect of various aspects of 
globalization and harmonization may have sizable consequences.23  
In what follows we consider the implications of increased labor mobility, particu-
larly, the increased mobility of highly skilled workers, and the incentives this increase 
in mobility generates for private and public incentives for human capital investment. 
Education and taxation 
With high labor mobility, the public benefits of higher education do not always accrue 
where education is funded. Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) point out that this may 
undermine existing frameworks for funding public higher education, reducing the local 
incentives for provision of public education. In their framework, they assume that edu-
cation is publicly provided and funded by the owners of a factor that is complementary 
to skilled labor. If labor reacts to wage differentials, a region can attract skilled labor by 
reducing its own level of public investment in education. They conclude that in the un-
coordinated Nash equilibrium there is public underinvestment in education.24 A related 
mechanism is explored in Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000). Here the unskilled co-
finance public education and are better-off from this because skilled and unskilled labor 
are complements. Again, introducing international mobility of the highly skilled gener-
ates free-riding incentives: the financing share of the skilled cannot be sustained, and an 
inferior outcome results. 
                                                 
22 A model analysing such information asymmetries can be found in Katz and Stark (1987). 
23 In addition, as pointed out by Pedersen et al. (2002), the growing pool of university graduates is mani-
fest in the fact that emigration in the 90s has grown, while propensities across levels of education has 
stayed relatively constant. 
24 In Gradstein and Justman (1995) international mobility generates an incentive to overinvest. The idea 
here is similar to Keen and Marchand (1997) who consider infrastructure competition for foreign di-
rect investment: if foreign direct investment is internationally mobile, regions can attract more foreign 
direct investment if they offer a skillful labor force. In an uncoordinated Nash equilibrium overin-
vestment in infrastructure/local human capital occurs. 
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Human capital mobility has also been considered in the tax competition literature. 
The increase in international mobility of highly skilled workers is an additional con-
straint for national tax policy. This insight is well established and clearly illustrated by 
Cremer et al. (1996). These authors discuss how robust the effects of the additional con-
straint are, given different institutional assumptions, and survey the extensive literature 
that considers this effect. They find that the mobility of human capital (that is, mobility 
of the highly skilled workers) reduces the scope for redistributive taxation.25  
Wildasin (2000b) has explored the interaction between the financing of human-
capital investments in an imperfect credit market and globalization. The setting is one 
where education produces specialized skills. Unskilled workers are intersectorally mo-
bile and geographically immobile; skilled workers are intersectorally immobile and 
globalization makes them geographically mobile. Globalization has the benefit of reduc-
ing the wage risk of high-skill workers. Wildasin compares the case where the educa-
tion investment can be financed privately with the case where it cannot. The key con-
clusion is that whereas globalization is unambiguously beneficial in the former case, it 
leads to low-skill workers carrying the entire cost of education in the latter case. While 
obviously extreme due to extreme mobility assumptions, the result is in line with a re-
current observation in this context: the timing of education subsidies makes mobility of 
skilled labor very costly for immobile workers. Also, the trade-off concerning education 
investment when education is publicly financed is very harsh – education is productive 
but very costly due to the fact that its cost must be borne by low-skill workers.  
The result in Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) rests on the assumption that educa-
tion investment has to be publicly provided and funded for exogenous reasons. How-
ever, education could be the instrument that counteracts the government failure of time 
consistent and excessive taxation. Suppose that international tax competition with re-
spect to human capital income really takes place. If the highly skilled are perfectly mo-
bile, the equilibrium tax rates in all countries are very low; in general terms, taxes re-
duce to pure equivalence taxation and redistribution ceases to be feasible.26,27 Accord-
ingly, there is no excessive taxation in the equilibrium in the globalized economy, and 
                                                 
25 Whether these effects are of practical relevance depends on whether the mechanisms that are de-
scribed in the theory of tax competition are at work or not, and this question is closely related to the 
question of whether the highly skilled have become or will soon become highly mobile. Empirical 
analyses of tax competition problems exist with respect to a number of issues. However, the outcome 
of this empirical work is often ambiguous. While the outcome is typically in line with the predictions 
of tax competition theory, there are several other plausible and competing hypotheses that could ex-
plain the data similarly well. See, e.g., Brueckner (2000) for a survey. 
26 Taxes used for public-good production might attract mobile factors if those factors benefit from the 
public goods in question. In fact, some empirical work on factor mobility indicates that infrastructure 
is more important than taxes for localization decisions. The basic point is made by Wildasin (2000a); 
the latter point is made by James Markusen in a comment published in Wildasin (2000a). 
27 An important observation is that education subsidies although not always redistributive are likely to 
be subject to downward pressure from globalization because of their timing properties: Although a 
high-skilled worker considering the possibility to migrate internationally likely has benefited from 
education subsidies in his country of origin, this does not constitute a reason to stay. 
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therefore no need for an education policy compensating for excessive taxation.28 For an 
extended analysis of the education-investment incentives of workers as well as govern-
ments in a scenario where education makes workers highly skilled and mobile, see 
Andersson and Konrad (2000a,b).29  
Insurance aspects      
Seen from the perspective of individuals who do not know yet whether their human 
capital investment will make them rich and successful or poor and unsuccessful, redis-
tributive taxation has features of an insurance policy. Time-consistent taxation in a 
closed economy will provide too much insurance, however, and thereby provide too 
weak (second-best) incentives for human-capital investment. If the public sector retreats 
from this insurance activity there will be a demand for private insurance. Whether and 
to what extent insurance markets will emerge is an interesting aspect of globalization. 
The answer depends on the extent to which insurance provided by redistributive taxa-
tion has crowded out private insurance that would have existed in the absence of such 
taxation; the viability of such markets will obviously depend critically on the way in-
formational problems on those markets are resolved.  
In the setting considered by Andersson and Konrad (2000a) where the investment in 
human capital is risky, and where globalization undermines redistributive taxation and 
leads to all education subsidies ultimately being borne by low-skill workers, the welfare 
effects of globalization depend critically on the possibility for workers to insure the out-
come of their investment ex ante. If such income insurance is available, globalization is 
unambiguously beneficial; if it is not available, welfare effects are ambiguous – there is 
overinsurance due to time-consistent taxation in the absence of globalization, and there 
is no insurance in the presence of globalization. It is clear, however, that unskilled 
workers fare badly under globalization without private insurance, and that the policy 
trade-off when the only policy instrument is education subsidies borne by low-skilled 
workers is very harsh.  
An aspect that has to be taken seriously in this context is the interim period. If glob-
alization was not anticipated by individuals who are now in their 50ths, they did not 
anticipate that redistribution will cease to exist once they reach this age, and they will 
not have bought private insurance. Hence, for this generation, unanticipated globaliza-
tion will lead to a strong increase in inequality.30  
                                                 
28 Kehoe (1989) was the first to notice that globalization may resolve the time consistency problem in 
taxation. 
29 The same forces may be induced if skilled labor is immobile, but capital complementary with skilled 
labor is internationally mobile. If net rents from the production utilizing skilled labor and mobile capi-
tal are shared by workers and capital owners, the same logic applies. 
30 The analysis in Andersson and Konrad (2000a) shows that risk spreading via redistributive taxation 
and private insurance markets are substitutes. Given the level of public risk sharing through redistribu-
tive taxation, the non-existence of private markets for such risks – such as private education loans that 
are paid back only in case of success – is not surprising. This non-existence does not prove that these 
markets would not exist if the government would withdraw from this insurance activity. 
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Mobility differences 
Different types of professions or individuals differ in their international mobility. Law-
yers or tax consultants are typically less internationally mobile than are medical doctors, 
engineers, computer specialists, or investment bankers. A government can choose 
whether to treat different professions differently, with respect to education investment 
subsidies and with respect to income taxes (see, for instance, Thum and Übelmesser 
2000), or whether to find a way to commit to treating mobile and immobile professions 
uniformly.  
With discriminatory tax rules, taxation and tax competition yields a situation in 
which immobile professions face high tax rates, and mobile professions pay little taxes. 
Accordingly, there is a hold-up problem with respect to investment in education for 
immobile professions, and no hold-up problem as regards education investment in pro-
fessions that are perfectly mobile since the private investment incentives in these pro-
fessions are high. According to the insights obtained from analyzing the hold-up prob-
lem in the closed economy and from analyzing globalization, it is optimal to use public 
education subsidies as a second-best policy to counteract the problem of underinvest-
ment in the immobile professions, whereas no active education policy is needed in pro-
fessions in which workers are perfectly mobile. The situation is more complex if dis-
criminatory education subsidies are not feasible due to, for instance, education not being 
sufficiently specific, and specialization for mobile or immobile professions occurring 
when some or all investment in education has already taken place. Similarly, discrimi-
natory taxation is sometimes not feasible, for instance because it is ruled out as violating 
some basic egalitarian principles in taxation (e.g., “horizontal equity”).31  
A recurrent observation when considering mobility differences is that a net fiscal 
burden can be imposed only on low-income earners if discriminatory taxation is possi-
ble and if high-income earners are perfectly mobile and low income earners are per-
fectly immobile. An implication of this is that an extortionary state would have to rely 
on immobile low-income earners as its main tax base. This fact generates an additional 
incentive for young persons to invest in human capital, and the relationship between 
productivity and mobility generates excess incentives for private human capital invest-
ment. An extortionary state that observes individuals trying to escape from taxation by 
investing in mobility enhancing human capital has an incentive to make it more difficult 
for the citizens to acquire such human capital, for instance by taxing such activities. 
These issues have been analyzed more closely in Andersson and Konrad (2000b). 
 
                                                 
31 In a tax competition framework, if countries can choose ex post between uniform taxation and taxa-
tion that differentiates with respect to mobility, there is a tendency to differentiate tax rates with re-
spect to mobility (Janeba and Peters, 1999). However, countries may coordinate on uniform taxation 
rules, and tax competition may then occur with respect to taxes obeying these rules. Keen (2000) has 
shown that whether tax revenue is higher with uniform taxation or with differentiated tax rates, is sur-
prisingly unclear; he presents the case where differentiated taxation generates more tax revenue. 
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4. Policy implications      
We identified several important reasons for government intervention in the market for 
education.   
First, concerns for redistribution and “equal opportunity” arguments may call for 
education policies that overcome credit market constraints and inequities in the process 
through which people make educational choices. Current attempts to generate “equal 
opportunities” are at best partially successful, and a whole battery of measures may be 
needed to counter the tendencies of a persistently scewed selection of students into 
higher education; as we have noted, there is evidence that private incentives and a 
strong emphasis on excellence may be beneficial rather than harmful in this regard. 
Moreover, free provision of education goods and education subsidies may reduce moral 
hazard problems in education goods markets and markets for student loans. A ‘caveat’ 
in this context is that although perfectly well-functioning private insurance markets and 
perfect credit markets cannot be established, current governmental tax and education 
policy may partially be responsible for these market deficiencies and may have crowded 
out some of these markets. The government may be able do a great deal to facilitate the 
emergence of such markets by changing the set of relevant constraints.   
Second, it is unclear whether current education policy is an efficient means of redis-
tributing from the rich to the poor. If this is the implicit aim of public education, one 
may want to choose an education system with several quality levels in which lower 
quality levels receive higher subsidies; in such a system redistribution occurs on a self-
selection basis. Such alternative types of redistribution mechanisms may become more 
important in a globalized economy in which the scope for redistribution in general is 
reduced.  
Third, we have compared the private and social benefits of education investment and 
identified a number of external effects of education. This analysis suggests that there are 
positive and negative externalities of education and the overall balance of external ef-
fects is unclear. The balance is more likely to be positive for primary and secondary 
education, however, suggesting that these types of education should be subsidized more 
strongly.  
Fourth, we have considered the interplay between education investment and taxa-
tion, and several conclusions follow. The analysis suggests that there is a fundamental 
distortion of the “input mix” in education; the costs of time inputs borne by students are 
deflated due to income taxation. An implication is that education policy should subsi-
dize education goods other than the time input more strongly than the time input. This 
may justify strict requirements regarding the overall time, or the number of failed at-
tempts in examinations, a student is allowed in obtaining a degree. It may also justify 
subsidies to physical assets that are used in education. Since students’ time input is 
probably complementary to the other resources devoted to their education, this is a rea-
son to emphasize quality rather than quantity in higher education. Further, we have ar-
gued that public education provision is partially motivated as a second-best tool for 
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overcoming the hold-up problem that is generated by time consistent excessive taxation 
of human capital returns. Globalization eliminates the scope for excessive taxation and 
the need for this second-best tool.  
Fifth, globalization has a number of implications for a nation’s optimal tax and edu-
cation policy. In general, globalization limits the scope for redistributive activities, and 
this may lead to lower taxes and less education subsidies. However, we may also expect 
a differentiation of taxes and education policy along the lines of differences in skill mo-
bility for different types of education and different professions. Our overall conclusion 
is that globalization will put pressure on government funding, including the public 
budget for expenditure on higher education, but that the simultaneous downward pres-
sure on the taxes of the returns to human capital is a countervailing force in terms of 
sustaining the level of investment in human capital. The tightening of goverments’ 
budgets and the limits this imposes also on public expenditure on education, however, 
calls for governments to focus their effort on alternative instruments that help promot-
ing the goals of traditional education policy.  
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